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Dear Mr. Levy: 
We are writing to provide you and members of the Board with our 
findings and recommendations regarding the procurement of 
Program and Construction Management Seryices (P/CM) for Deer 
1Zland- elated .---- Construction., 
We want to thank you for your cooperation and assistance during 
this phase of the joint review by our Offices. You have made 
available for this review all documents that were requested, 
and your staff has cooperated in providing information over the 
course of many hours of interviews. We appreciate the courtesy 
and candor displayed by you and your top staff. 
At this stage in our review, we have found no evidence that 
leads us to conclude that any individual violated any criminal 
statute. 
We have, however, found serious flaws in the procurement 
procedures that the Authority has utilized for this contract. 
These procedures and the resulting contract are vulnerable to 
waste and abuse. 
This letter summarizes the deficiencies we have found in the 
Authority's procurement of the P/CM contract, and concludes 
with our recommendations. 
Paul F. Levy, Executive Director 
Massachusetts Water Resources Authority 
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In procuring this contract, the Authority for the most part 
followed procedures originally adopted in 1985. These 
procedures are, according to Authority staff, utilized for 
virtually all procurements of services by the Authority. 
The procedures call for a two-step process: a Request for 
Qualifications (RFQ) phase, in which the qualifications of all 
competing firms are evaluated, and the number of competitors is 
reduced (or nshort-listedl'); and a Request for Proposals (RFP) 
phase, in which the short-listed firms are invited to submit 
proposals (including proposed fees) for providing the services 
sought by the Authority. We found deficiencies in both phases 
of the P/CM procurement; many of these deficiencies are 
attributable to weaknesses in the Authority's 1985 procedures. 
The RFO Phase 
1. T h e r . 1  
of the evaluation criteria utilized by the Authoritv. 
The 22-page RFQ issued on October 30, 1987, set forth, in half 
a page, six criteria for judging the qualifications of 
competing firms. The criteria were extremely general. For 
example, one of the six criteria consisted, in-its entirety, of 
the following: "Qualifications of the project manager and the 
specific individuals committed to the project." The list of 
criteria offered no further explanation as to exactly what 
qualifications the Authority deemed necessary. 
In fact, the seven-member selection committee utilized fifty- 
two subcriteria in rating the firms which responded to the RFQ. 
For example, each firm's proposed project manager was judged, 
among other things, on the basis of "MIS [management 
information systems] knowledge and experiencen as well as 
"local familiarity,'' two subcriteria listed on the selection 
committee's score sheets but not provided to the competing 
firms. While it is arguable that these criteria might have 
been inferable from the project description contained elsewhere 
in the RFQ, nothing in the RFQ put competitors clearly on 
notice that the Authority wished to see these attributes 
personified in the project manager. 
Another criterion stated in the RFQ was the following: "Proven 
track record in meeting schedules and cost control." A 
subcriterion appearing in the committee's score sheets is, 
"Experience in court-ordered schedules." While obviously the 
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Authority is under a court order, and the RFQ so stated, 
nothing in the RFQ suggested that a firm's on-time record would 
be downgraded if achieved in the absence of a judicial decree. 
Another criterion stated in the RFQ was as follows: 
ffExperience of the firm (and/or Joint Venture team members) in 
the management of similar scale construction projects 
particularly those involving . . . underwater tunnel 
construction . . .If The selection committee utilized three 
subcriteria involving experience of the firm, the project 
manager, and key staff with "hard rock tunnels." Underwater 
tunnels may not involve hard rock. If the Authority wished to 
limit its view to hard rock tunnels, or to downgrade a firm for 
failing to provide information on hard rock tunnel construction 
experience, the Authority's criteria should have said so. They 
did not. 
A procurement system is not fair if it fails to enunciate in 
advance, clearly and publicly, the criteria by which 
competitors are to be judged. At best, competitors are left to 
guess at the rules, and well-qualified competitors may be 
downgraded simply for guessing wrong; at worst, the system puts 
a premium on inside information. 
2. Some of the RFQ criteria and subcriteria were too vaque 
q  
Some of the written criteria and subcriteria were too vague to 
provide useful standards for comparing the qualifications of 
competing firms. The selection committee introduced 
distinctions that were not articulated in either the criteria 
or subcriteria. 
In particular, firms wishing to respond to the RFQ were 
required to submit a five-page essay describing -- in advance 
of seeing the Authority's RFP -- the firmsf "management 
approaches intended to maintain the court-ordered schedule, 
control costs, mitigate claims, maintain community relations, 
and resolve logistical constraints . . ." The firms were 
further required to submit one-page statements "commenting on 
or suggesting approaches tow eight "issuesff which the Authority 
itself had apparently not resolved. One of these issues was 
"Incentive-based compensation for the P/CMw (that is, how the 
firm felt about one approach to getting paid); another was "The 
program to maintain positive community relationsff -- a program 
yet to be defined by the Authority. 
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It is difficult to see how the Authority could have fairly 
utilized these responses. The applicable selection criterion, 
as stated in the RFQ, was hopelessly vague: I1Specific 
understanding of the program and construction management task 
and knowledge of the area as demonstrated in the quality of the 
proposed approach." The applicable subcriteria were equally 
standardless: "Responses to special issues [followed by a list 
of the issues, e.g., "positive community relations"IM; 
"Familiarity with regulatory agen~ies~~; "Familiarity with 
local constr~ction~~. 
It would have been appropriate for the Authority to seek and 
evaluate, on the basis of stated criteria, construction 
experience within Massachusetts. It was not appropriate, 
however, for the Authority to compare ~responsesw to vaguely 
worded wissues,ll nor to evaluate and compare actual experience 
(or, as phrased in the subcriteria, "familiarityw) from those 
brief responses. 
The firms had not been provided with a detailed RFP, setting 
out precisely the services sought by the Authority and the 
standards by which the Authority would evaluate proposed 
approaches to ~rovidins exactly those services; without clearer 
guidance from the Authority, these sketchy submissions amounted 
to a standardless essay contest. Firms were apparently 
downgraded if their responses were deemed by the committee to 
be too "generic." 
The Authority's 1985 rules call for "financial stabilityw of 
competing firms to be evaluated in the RFQ phase. In the P/CM 
procurement, the evaluation of financial stability was not 
undertaken in the RFQ phase. As explained by the chairman of 
the selection committee, the Authority omitted from the RFQ, by 
mistake, a requirement that firms submit audited financial 
statements upon which an evaluation could have been based. 
Therefore, consideration of financial stability was deferred 
until the RFP stage. 
The omission -- which would have been easily corrected in a 
less vulnerable selection process -- may have contributed to 
the unfairness of this procurement. The omission undoubtedly 
had the effect of advantaging the firm which was ultimately 
selected. But whether that effect would have been large or 
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small is a matter of pure speculation. Had all of the firms 
been rated and compared on the basis of financial information, 
the committee's overall judgment as to the ranking, and indeed 
the decision as to how many firms to allow into the RFP phase, 
might have been different. Certainly, financial stability 
ought to be a consideration in determining whether a firm is 
qualified for a large public contract. 
Whatever the effect of the omission, the criterion itself 
further illustrates the lack of clear standards in the 
Authority's procedures. Although the Authority's rules call 
for "financial stability" to be evaluated, they provide no clue 
as to what level of financial stability is required. Indeed, 
Authority staff members acknowledged in an interview that, if a 
firm had not declared bankruptcy, they were uncertain as to 
whether the Authority should or could exclude the firm from 
competing for a contract. Following the Authority's rules 
would simply have added one more standardless criterion to the 
mix. 
The selection committee relied heavily on a numerical rating 
system. Such systems have a tendency to focus the attention of 
evaluators and the ultimate decision-makers on numbers rather 
than on the appropriateness of the judgments underlying the 
numerical scores. As used in this procurement, the 
overreliance on numerical scores proved particularly vulnerable 
for several reasons. 
First, the evaluation committee members were provided with no 
written instructions as to how to score each criterion. For 
example, there was no indication of what it might take to get a 
perfect score on any criterion, nor were evaluators told 
whether it would be appropriate or inappropriate to grade on a 
curve (that is, giving a high score to the best of a bad lot on 
any criterion). Coupled with vaguely worded criteria, the 
absence of clear guidance left each rater to devise major 
elements of the grading procedure. One member assigned points 
to each subcriterion; the others awarded points only for each 
general criterion. This lack of guidance was particularly 
troublesome because of the make-up of the selection committee. 
Four members had engineering backgrounds; three did not. Yet 
the three members having no engineering background were asked, 
without written instructions, to evaluate the quality of a 
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firmls experience and award numerical points on such criteria 
as Itlarge diameter, hard rock tunnels," "marine constr~ction,~~ 
and 'Ivalue engineering" experience. A rater's assignment of 
points under these conditions is almost inevitably arbitrary. 
Second, several committee members1 evaluations consisted of 
little (or no) more than the bare numbers. The committee 
chairman produced twenty-one pages of typed, detailed notes, 
and two other members made extensive notations on their score 
sheets. But the majority left a scantier record. Two members 
made a few notes and check marks on their score sheets; two 
other members contributed no notes whatever. Moreover, one of 
the members who made careful notes in his original scoring 
subsequently changed his mind, in the course of committee 
discussions, but left no record as to why. A selection system 
which focuses on numerical point awards, while tolerating the 
absence of clear, written explanations for those ratings by the 
responsible public officials, invites arbitrary and 
unaccountable decisions. 
Third, the scoring methodology introduced a conversion factor 
which increased the likelihood of an arbitrary decision. The 
committee converted each member's scores for each of the six 
competing firms (these raw scores were on a 100-point scale, 
with higher scores for "better1' qualifications) to a numerical 
rank order. That is, whatever the raw score assigned by a 
member to the firm he rated most highly, that score was simply 
converted to a new six-point scale; that member's top-rated 
firm was assigned 1 point, his second-ranked firm was assigned 
2 points, etc. Every firm thus received from one to six 
points. On the new scale, the "better1' the firm, the lower its 
points. The committee then added the points each member 
awarded to each firm, using the six-point scale, to arrive at 
total points. The three firms with the lowest totals won the 
right to participate in the RFP phase. 
The problem with such a mechanical transposition is that it is 
utterly arbitrary. The arbitrariness is particularly acute if 
the purpose of the scoring system -- as in this instance -- is 
to narrow a pool of competitors down to a predetermined number. 
If the raw scores are far apart, the transposition will make 
the competitors appear more closely matched; if, as was the 
case here, the raw scores are relatively close, the 
transposition may exaggerate the differences among competitors. 
The transposition may also result in a change in ranking. In 
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this case, although the documentation is too sparse to be 
certain, it appears that arbitrarily converting the points from 
one scale to another may have determined which firm came in 
third -- and thus was able to submit a proposal. The chart 
which follows shows the total raw scores of committee members, 
from their score sheets, prior to discussions during which one 
committee member apparently changed his mind about some of his 
scores: 
Total Raw Scores 
Criteria 
Boston 
Harbor Boston 
Program Morrison Harbor Rust sverdrup 
Manasers Kaiser Knudson Partners Intl. & Parcel 
Experience (Max=150) 125 12 6 110 113 114 115 
Project Manager 
Qualifications 
(Max=105) 84 83 77 85 75 68 
Staff Qualifications 
(Max=70) 55 56 53 60 56 46 
Scheduling & Cost 
Controls (Max=140) 113 112 102 103 106 103 
Understanding 
(Max=105) 79 93 87 90 83 77 
Ability to Work 
Together (Max=35) 29 31 28 21 28 27 
Affirmative Action 
Program (Max=70) - 40 - 54 43 61 
- - 48 - 44 
Total Score (Max=675) 525 555 
- - 500 
Percent of ~aximum 
Score 77.8% 82.2% 74.1% 79.0% 75.6% 71.1% 
Because of inadequate documentation, it is not possible to 
establish how these raw scores would have changed when one 
committee member changed his mind; new scores simply were not 
recorded. However, this snapshot of the scoring process 
suggests a relatively close race (particularly given the 
absence of clear standards and instructions). 
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Under the conversion formula, the top three firms (and the 
converted points awarded) were as follows: Kaiser Engineers, 
Inc. (13) ; Harbor Partners (20) ; and Rust International (25) . 
The fourth- and fifth-place finishers came within only 3 points 
of Rust International (the change in rankings made by one 
committee member did not affect the first- and second-place 
choices on either scale). Kaiser appears as a result of the 
conversion to have markedly superior qualifications. Thus, it 
appears that negligible differences among firms were 
exaggerated by use of the conversion formula. 
Our conclusion is that the raw scores were themselves 
unreliable. Applying the conversion formula amounted to 
holding these scores up to a circus mirror and basing the final 
decision on the reflected image. A bad situation was made 
worse. 
Such mechanical rating manipulations, however well- 
intentioned, have no place in a prudent, soundly reasoned, 
well-documented procurement system. . 
The failure of individual selection committee members to record 
the bases for their ratings undermines the reliability of those 
ratings. Indeed, in the absence of any other record, the 
numbers (which represent attempts to quantify various judgments 
which may not be susceptible to quantification) become all- 
important. In a prudent and accountable procurement process, 
what matters is the care and persuasiveness of the reasoning 
underlying the selection of a vendor. In this procurement, the 
record of that reasoning is characterized by large gaps. 
The minutes of the two meetings of the selection committee are 
brief and inadequate. A two-hour discussion that produced the 
ultimate ranking of the six firms on the basis of fifty-two 
subcriteria is reduced in the minutes to fourteen brief 
comments. 
An accountable process requires clear and detailed 
documentation at every step. 
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6. The elimination of three firms at the RFQ staae undulv 
limited com~etition for the P/CM contract. 
A sound public procurement process seeks to maximize 
competition among qualified firms. Unwarranted restrictions on 
competition risk inflated costs, poorer services, and 
vulnerability to waste and abuse. 
The RFQ process utilized by the Authority did not yield a 
convincing basis for eliminating anv of the competing firms. 
Indeed, the chairman of the selection committee stated in 
interviews that he regarded all six firms to be Itqualified." 
The Authority failed to enunciate clear, objective standards 
for distinguishing between qualified and unqualified firms. 
Such standards should have been articulated in this 
procurement, and would have adequately protected the Authority 
from doing business with any unqualified firm. 
Instead, the Authority listed vague criteria by which it hoped 
to compare the relative merits of competitors, in order to 
achieve the arbitrary goal of reducing the competition to three 
or four firms. 
The most basic flaw in the RFQ phase was that this goal -- to 
reduce competition to a predetermined range -- was contrary to 
the best interests of the ~uthority and its rate-payers. 
In our view, the benefit to the Authority of restricting the 
competition was a negligible time saving in the Authority's 
review of proposals. The cost would appear far greater: the 
lost opportunity to consider proposals (and proposed fees) from 
other qualified firms. 
The RFP Phase 
The RFP contained the same general evaluation criteria as 
appeared in the RFQ, with two additions: the cost proposed by 
each firm, and "familiarity in dealing with the requirements of 
regulatory agencies" (which had been a subcriterion in the RFQ 
stage). 
For the most part, the subcriteria remained the same, as well, 
although the list of subcriteria grew to sixty-three. Just as 
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the RFQ subcriteria were unavailable to respondents, the RFP 
subcriteria were not disclosed to proposers in the RFP. 
The criteria and subcriteria from the RFQ phase remained just 
as vague when the process moved to the RFP stage. For example, 
one criterion in the RFP was as follows: "Specific 
understanding of the construction management task and knowledge 
of the area as demonstrated in the quality of the proposed 
approach and scope of the work.l8 Vague as this criterion is, 
it was further confounded by the addition of a new 
subcriterion: "quality of additions the scopew of work in 
the RFP [emphasis added]. 
One of the bedrock principles of prudent public procurement is 
that the awarding authority should define its own needs and 
then seek a vendor to fulfill those needs; it is not conducive 
to fair competition or prudent cost control to invite 
prospective vendors to write their own specifications for some 
or all of the work. 
This procurement departed from that principle. The RFP stated: 
"The proposer shall feel free to propose additional activities 
that are felt [by the proposer] to be necessary to provide 
effective management of the planning and design of the Deer 
Island projects. " 
This invitation led to the standardless attempt by the 
Authority to compare the "qualityn of add-on services that were 
not identified in the RFP. 
Perhaps symptomatic of the ill-defined evaluation criteria was 
the ambiguity in the criterion of Minority and Women Business 
Enterprise Participation (MBE/WBE). Although the Authority's 
affirmative action policies and goals were set forth in 
considerable detail, the precise evaluation criteria remained 
vague. The RFP said that firms would be evaluated for 
I1Creativity in complying with the Authority's Affirmative 
Action Program"; no definition of wcreativityll was offered. 
The subcriteria utilized by the selection committee omitted any 
reference to creativity, and instead referred to the "extent1' 
to which minimum goals were exceeded; "commitment of minorities 
and women to senior level positionsn; and "work profiles of the 
proposed teams." No further written instructions guided the 
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evaluators. In the end, the critical inquiry became one of 
whether the winning firm had met the bare minimum requirement - 
- and that inquiry suggested that the minimum requirement was 
ambiguous. A review of the proposals by Touche Ross & Co., 
commissioned by the Authority as part of the RFP process, 
indicates three possible ways of calculating compliance with 
the Authority's MBE/WBE participation requirements; Kaiser's 
proposal was determined by Touche Ross to be deficient under 
two of the methodologies. The Authority apparently elected to 
utilize the third. 
3. The RFP failed to define clearly the services souqht by 
the Authoritv. 
In significant areas, the RFP contained unacceptably vague 
descriptions of the services to be provided. For example, 
proposers were required to describe how they would "assist the 
Authority in determining and executing the most effective 
manner of providing key construction support services such as 
the operation of a water transportation system . . ." Firms 
were referred to Appendix G for additional information on this 
system. There was no Appendix G. The Authority did not yet 
know the dimensions of its water transportation system, which 
was to be put out to bid separately; yet it sought from 
proposers information about how the proposer planned to 
vassistw in operating an undefined system, and how much the 
proposer would charge for this assistance. 
Other services were described with similar vagueness. The RFP 
called for firms to propose "an aggressive community relations 
program." The aims of this program were set out in eight 
typewritten lines. Firms were left to define the dimensions 
and cost of the program. One proposal offered a $1 million 
program; the winning proposal offered a $2.4 million program. 
Another example of vagueness is the description of the P/CMvs 
responsibilities regarding Management Information Systems 
(MIS). The RFP calls for the P/CM to ndevelop, update and 
maintainn a comprehensive computer system that will be 
compatible with the internal system the Authority is 
developing. The Authority is pledging to reimburse the P/CM 
for the full cost of the P/CMvs system, including hardware and 
software. This is not a prudent way of acquiring any MIS 
capability. The Authority does not know what system it will 
acquire for itself; yet it now plans to reimburse the P/CM for 
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an undefined system of unknown size and complexity without 
further competition. 
A vague description of services in an RFP undermines fair 
competition. It is impossible to compare firms on an equal 
footing if each firm can write its own specifications for the 
services to be performed. A vague RFP also invites waste; 
each proposer is encouraged to expand the services (and the 
cost) beyond what the Authority has ascertained to be its 
needs. Finally, a vague RFP opens the door to favoritism: 
when neither the evaluation criteria nor the services 
themselves are clearly defined, awards based on favoritism 
become harder to detect. 
4. The ~ r o ~ o s e d  contract, as described in the RFP, is 
excessively vulnerable to uncontrolled costs. 
In at least a half dozen respects, the proposed contract is 
likely to prove vulnerable to escalating costs. 
(a) Incentive payments. Authority staff estimated in an 
interview that up to $700,000 under the contract is subject to 
payment on an incentive basis. That is, the actual amount paid 
to the firm as the work progresses will be determined on the 
basis of various incentive factors. The factors, as suggested 
in the RFP, are as ill-defined as the evaluation criteria. 
They include such nebulous factors -- to be further negotiated 
before the contract is signed -- as "speedy mobilization," 
"effectiveness in community relations," "resolution of 
unforseen  issue^,^^ and "effective management of lead design 
engineer." What we have seen of the RFQ and RFP process gives 
cause for concern that incentive payments to the P/CM will be 
predicated on standardless reviews of performance. The 
Authority will, on each bill, choose between reductions from 
the maximum payment allowed (and a confrontation with the P/cM) 
or full payment (and a contented P/CM). The incentive system 
as described in the RFP does not appear to be one that can be 
prudently managed. 
(b) Allowances. The RFP included wallowancestl for many 
services that were not adequately defined. These allowances 
included $300,000 for "project mobilization," $400,000 for the 
MIS, $400,000 for seeking regulatory approvals, $100,000 for 
environmental analyses that may be needed, $75,000 for 
unspecified "staff supportw to the Authority, and $150,000 for 
yet-to-be-defined "special activitiesn which may arise. The 
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total of these allowances is $1.5 million. All but one of 
these allowances reflect the Authority's ballpark budget 
figures for items it chose to include in the RFP even though 
the Authority could not precisely describe the services it 
wanted; the amounts the Authority will actually pay, and the 
services the Authority will actually receive, will be 
determined through negotiation. In effect, each of these 
services will now be defined and paid for on a sole-source 
basis. These services should simply have been excluded from 
the RFP. 
The remaining item is "project  mobilization^ -- the P/CMts 
costs for establishing an office near the Authority's. The 
Authority promised in the RFP to reimburse this cost -- based, 
at least in part, on the P/CM1s internal policies for 
relocating its employees. A more tightly written RFP, with 
more clearly defined services, would not have made this item 
subject to open-ended negotiation at the end of the selection 
process. Each firm should have been required to include the 
full costs of hiring that firm -- including mobilization 
costs -- in its proposal. 
(c) Reimbursables. Some of the allowance items may be 
negotiated to a fixed cost; some (such as project mobilization 
and MIS) were advertised in the RFP as reimbursables. 
Reimbursable items are allowed elsewhere in the RFP, as well: 
computer charges, printing, travel, insurance, rent, and 
utilities. Reimbursable items invite higher costs. There is 
no incentive for the vendor to refrain from incurring the cost, 
or to seek the lowest cost, if the expense is to be passed 
along to the Authority. Moreover, verifying the accuracy and 
legitimacy of a reimbursable expense puts on the Authority the 
burden of auditing the expense. The total amount of 
reimbursables is, of course, unknown (and perhaps, under the 
terms of this RFP, presently unknowable). The estimates for 
just two items -- project mobilization and MIS -- total 
$700,000. The eventual amount is likely to be significantly 
higher. 
(d) Cost ~ l u s  fixed fee. The basic fee structure of the 
entire contract invites overruns. The P/CM is to be paid on a 
cost-plus-fixed-fee basis. The wcostm component of the 
Authority's payments is based on labor and overhead rates 
proposed by the P/CM. Each firm also submitted an estimated 
Itlevel of effortn for each task in the RFP -- that is, the 
firm's own estimate of the number of person-hours various 
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employees of the firm will take to perform each task. The 
problem is that many of the tasks in this contract are too ill- 
defined to permit much confidence in the accuracy of the 
estimated levels of effort; had the tasks been more completely 
defined, the firms could have been required to submit prices 
for completing each task. Since the Authority has not 
described precisely what it wants (for example, what 
constitutes an "aggressive community relations program," or 
what assistance it needs with the transportation system), the 
Authority has little basis for insisting that the P/CM complete 
the necessary tasks in strict conformity with the estimated 
levels of effort. There is a high probability that costs under 
this contract will significantly exceed present estimates. 
(e) Neqotiations. Given the vague scope of services, the 
unreliability of cost estimates, the undefined criteria for 
incentive fees, and the imprecision about exactly what expenses 
are reimbursable, there is little of the P/CM contract that is 
not subject to negotiations. Such open-ended negotiations are 
-
a no-win situation for the Authority. If the Authority 
negotiates a significant reduction in the scope of the contract 
by eliminating some of the least cost-controlled aspects, the 
result would be a different contract from the one that was 
advertised; such a change, in itself, would constitute a mark 
of an unfair procurement process, since competing firms might 
have approached the process differently had the new terms been 
advertised. On the other hand, if the Authority presses ahead 
with the contract as outlined in the RFP, cost overruns are 
likely. In a tightly structured procurement process, the 
boundaries of negotiations should be far more limited. 
(f) Extension. The proposed contract will last for three 
years. Authority staff, in interviews, estimated that the 
selected firm would have approximately 50 persons on the 
contract payroll. But that is only the beginning. P/CM 
services will be needed for several years after the current 
contract; indeed, once construction starts -- four years from 
now -- Authority staff estimated that the P/CM would add 
another 200 persons to the payroll. Unless the Authority 
begins planning now, two developments are virtually certain: 
the P/CM will be awarded a new or extended contract at the 
expiration of this contract; and the P/CM1s fees will soar. 
Those fees will far exceed the amounts the Authority would 
incur by adding, three years from now, equivalent positions to 
its own payroll (to the extent.prudently necessary) instead of 
paying the P/CM to increase its payroll. To avoid enormous 
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fees later, the Authority should begin now to plan a staffing 
pattern that minimizes the costs of huge consultant contracts 
in the coming years. The RFP, while referring vaguely to a 
plan for "transferring the final responsibilities to the 
owner's staff," did not include clear provisions for minimizing 
the expansion and cost of the P/CM arrangement in the years 
following this three-year contract. 
Recommendations 
Two recommendations follow from our review. 
First, we recommend that the Authority cancel this procurement 
and restart it under new procedures. The Authority's current 
procurement procedures are fundamentally deficient. They do 
not adequately protect the Authority or its rate-payers from 
fraud, waste, and abuse in the award of contracts. 
Second, we recommend that the Authority adopt as its procedures 
the proposed Uniform Procurement Code which we made available 
. .  
to you and is now pending in the Legislature. While as drafted 
the legislation does not apply to the Authority, we recommend 
that the Authority adopt these procedures. 
We stand ready to assist you and the Authority as you proceed. 
spector General 
cc: Board of Directors 
